Shortage is common in many markets, such as those for human organs or blood, but the problem is often difficult to solve through price adjustment, given safety and ethical concerns. In this paper, we study two non-price methods that are often used to alleviate shortage for human blood. The first method is informing existing donors of a current shortage via a mobile message and encouraging them to donate voluntarily. The second method is asking the patient's family or friends to donate in a family replacement (FR) program at the time of shortage. Using 447,357 individual donation records across 8 years from a large Chinese blood bank, we show that both methods are effective in addressing blood shortage in the short run but have different implications for total blood supply in the long run. We compare the efficacy of these methods and discuss their applications under different scenarios to alleviate shortage.
Introduction
When market supply falls short of market demand, economists often recommend price adjustment to clear the market. However, due to safety and ethical concerns, many markets prohibit price adjustments or do not allow a market price to exist at all (Roth 2007) . Organ, tissue, and blood donations are prominent examples. A stream of research has examined how matching mechanisms can increase the number of kidney transplants conditional on a pool of people who have already expressed an intent to donate (Roth et al. 2004 (Roth et al. , 2005 . However, the number of donors is still low relative to the increasing demand, which highlights the importance of recruiting new donors Roth 2012, 2014) . Economic incentive (Lacetera et al. 2012 and alternative allocation policies (Kessler and Roth 2012) have been proposed to increase donations. While effective, much uncertainty and many restrictions still remain in implementing these proposals (WHO 2009 . Thus, recent research has called for studies on alternative methods to induce donations (Lacetera et al. 2014 , Goette et al. 2010 ).
To answer this call, we study the impact of non-price methods in addressing shortage.
Specifically, we are interested in three questions. First, can market designers utilize "shortage" as a tool to encourage more donation from donors and therefore increase market supply? Second, even if shortage-based methods lead to greater supply in the short run, will the effect last? Third, in the long run, can shortage-based methods help recruit and retain new donors? To address these questions, we study two shortage-based non-price methods that practitioners often consider in blood donation.
Shortage is common and frequent in the human blood market . World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that blood donation by 1% of the population is a general minimum needed to meet a nation's most basic requirements for blood; and such a minimum requirement is higher in countries with more advanced health care systems (WHO 2009) . Figure   1 presents a WHO map of donation rate as of 2007. Countries that have low donation rate per capita are often poor and suffer from long lasting blood shortage. In contrast, mid-to-high income countries have relatively high donation rates and are more likely to experience seasonal or typespecific shortage due to unexpected attritions or emergency events. Mostly driven by quality concerns, the WHO advocates for 100% unpaid voluntary donation for all medical use of human blood. 1 But this goal is hard to reach in many countries. As of 2012, 73 countries collected over 1 WHO (2009) stated that "more than 30 years after the first World Health Assembly resolution (WHA28.72) …. family replacement and paid donation continue in many countries even though there is convincing evidence that they are both less safe and that their use can inhibit progress to a safer system based on 100% VNRBD." VNRBD stands for 100% voluntary non-remunerated blood donation. 90% of their blood supply from voluntary unpaid blood donors; however, 72 countries collected more than 50% of their blood supply from family replacement or paid donors (WHO 2014) .
Facing shortage and a ban on monetary incentive, blood banks often resort to two nonprice methods to meet their needs. First, they strive to recruit more unpaid voluntary donors by sending shortage message (SM) to past donors. However, if shortage is too severe or too frequent, donor recruitment via SM alone may not be sufficient to close the gap. Another method is implementing a family replacement (FR) program. At the time of shortage, a patient in need of blood can be given the option to recruit her family or friends to donate blood so that she can use the blood immediately. In practice, because not all blood types can be transfused safely between individuals, the blood bank swaps FR donation with the same amount of blood from the inventory for the dedicated patient. This paper evaluates the effect of SM and FR on blood supply, using a unique dataset from China. Our data come from a large blood bank located in a major Chinese city with over 8 million population as of 2012. Since 2009, the city has faced increasing blood shortage, and used both SM and the FR to address the shortage.
For both methods, it is not easy to quantify the tradeoffs facing the blood bank because individual motives are often unobservable. Fortunately, our data contain over 330,000 individual donors and their donation history from 2005 to 2013, which allows us to find control individuals that are closely matched with individuals who either received the shortage message or donated via FR. As detailed below, the effect of SM is cleanly identified because sometimes the blood supply is short for only certain blood type(s), which gives us exogeneity in terms of who received a SM specific to the blood type in short supply. The variation in FR and non-FR donation is less clean, because individuals may self-select into FR donation through an unobserved process. We articulate the implication of such selection and find a way to separate the causal effect of the FR program from potential selection.
Comparing treated and control individuals, we find that SM leads to more donations among existing donors within the first six months but no significant effect afterwards. This effect is stronger for donors who donated more times before receiving the shortage message, suggesting a greater warm glow effect for donors who donate more in the past 2 . In comparison, FR donation 2 By 'warm glow', we mean both pure altruism and warm feeling of doing good for other. In the economics literature, individuals with pure altruism gain utility from increasing the welfare of others, while individuals motivated by the warm feeling of doing good can only receive such utility from their own contributions directly (Andreoni, 1989; 1990) . Studies in the lab and the field have confirmed the importance of warm feelings (Crumpler and Grossman, 2008, DellaVigna et al. 2012) , and find that donations connected with a greater sense of need or deservingness also create more warm feelings (Konow 2010) . In our context, it is difficult to distinguish pure altruism from warm feelings, so we refer to both as the 'warm glow'. encourages existing donors (who donated before the FR) to donate more blood voluntarily after their FR donation, but discourages no-history donors (whose first donation is FR) from donating in the long run. This is consistent with findings on SM and suggests that, for donors who have donated before, warm glow dominates the potential negative effects of substituting today's donation for future donation (referred to as "substitution" hereafter) or becoming more reluctant to contribute because other people do not contribute enough (referred to as "conditional cooperation"). In the meantime, our results suggest that the substitution or conditional cooperation effects are more prevalent for donors who donated less in the past. In addition, we do not find evidence that SM or FR leads to worse blood quality. Overall, the effect of SM and FR on blood supply is large and comparable to the effect of high-stake economic incentives reported in recent literature (Lacetera et al. 2014 , Iajya et al. 2013 , Goette and Stutzer 2008 .
Because neither treatment worsens blood quality, the efficiency comparison between the two methods is largely dependent on level of control, targeted audience, cost of implementation, and the effects of treatment in the short and long runs. Back-of-envelope calculation suggests that SM can be used in places where the donor population is large and the shortage is less severe and type-specific, while FR could be more useful in generating a significant blood supply in the short run when the donor population is small and the shortage is severe and general. However, in the long run, the conditional cooperation or substitution effects of FR on no-history donors may exacerbate the shortage problem, especially in a society with a low donation rate (which may be the reason for a severe shortage to begin with).
Our findings contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, previous studies have examined the effect of altruism, social image, empathy, generosity, reciprocity and norm, and other non-price methods on donation (Andreoni and Rao 2011 , Culyer 1973 , 1977 , DellaVigna et al. 2012 , Edwards and List 2014 , Lacetera and Macis 2010 , Stutzer et al. 2011 , Wildman and Hollingsworth 2009 , but most of those methods did not target shortage specifically. One notable exception is a recent study by Bruhin et al. (2015) , which exploits a natural experiment to study the effect of phone calls on individual donation behavior in both short and long runs. Similar to their work, we aim to extend this literature stream on non-price methods for donation and examine how two widely used methods of informing donors about shortage (i.e. SM and FR) can help to induce more donations and alleviate shortage. Compared with mobile messages sent by the same bank that do not mention a "shortage" (as documented by Sun et al. 2015 in a field experiment), the "shortage-based" message studied in this paper is five times more effective in terms of response rate. 3 In addition, we are among the first social scientists to study the FR program, which is based on shortage by definition. 4 Second, while most studies have focused on driving donations from existing donors (Lacetera et al. 2014 ), our study shows that an FR program can be effective in reaching and recruiting new donors at a relatively low cost. Since most such donors may otherwise never donate, their contribution represents a net increase in the blood supply. Third, most studies of blood donation have focused on the short-run effect. The only exceptions we are aware of are Lacetera et al. (2012 Lacetera et al. ( , 2014 , who found no significant longrun effect of economic incentives, and Bruhim et al. (2015) , who found phone call can lead to habit formation among less motivated donors with a low baseline donation rate and increases their donation rate later on. 5 More interestingly, we find that the long-run effect differs across the two shortage-based methods and varies from existing to new donors. These differential effects are important for market designers to evaluate non-price interventions.
Background and Data
Our data come from a centralized Chinese blood bank in a provincial capital city with a population of more than 8 million. The blood center is responsible for supplying blood to 18 hospitals in the city and is encouraged to equalize demand and supply of whole blood on its own. 6
Since 2009, the city has faced increasing blood shortage, partly due to increased demand. As a result, the bank has used both SM and FR to address the shortage.
General Practices in the Blood Bank
Before we describe the implementation of SM and FR, it is worthwhile to overview the bank's general practice. The bank accepts both whole blood donation and platelet donation.
Because platelet donation has a much more stable donor pool and most donors donate repeatedly, whole blood donation presents a bigger challenge for the bank to recruit new donors and motivate existing donors to donate multiple times. This paper focuses on whole blood donation only. 3 The comparison is imperfect and based on a few assumptions. We state the assumptions on page 19 and acknowledge potential limitations. 4 Iajya et al. (2013) assessed the impact of information, social prestige and financial rewards on voluntary blood donations in Argentina, where 88% of blood donations are emergency/replacement donations. However, their study does not examine the effect of replacement donation on future voluntary donation. 5 Some interventions are found to have long run impact in other contexts. For example, Charness and Gneezy (2009) found that temporary incentives affect longer term behavior in physical exercise. Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) and Deci et al. (1999) identify that incentive may crowd out intrinsic motivation in the long run. 6 In the rare cases of emergency blood shortage, the blood center may request an extra supply from nearby blood banks, but at extremely high transportation and administration costs. Such a situation is very rare, according to the blood bank staff that we interviewed.
In our data period, the bank has collected voluntary whole blood donation by 17 permanent street mobiles spread across the city and by group drives at specific universities, companies and government agencies. The blood center's administrative database includes every donation record from 2005/1/1 to 2013/8/10, tracking the exact time, location, form (street mobiles or group drive), amount (200ml, 300ml, or 400ml ) and quality ("pass" or "fail") of donation, as well as the donor's age, gender, education and marriage status at the time of donation. The blood center carefully removes all identity-related information and identifies each donor by a unique, scrambled donor ID, allowing us to follow the donation behavior of each donor over time.
The Implementation of Shortage Message (SM) and Family Replacement (FR)
In almost all circumstances, hospitals limit blood transfusion to the same blood type between donors and patients. As a result, the bank is pressed to equalize demand and supply within each blood type. During our data period (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) , the bank has implemented two large-scale blood type-specific shortage messages for whole blood: one was specific to type B (2012/10/8); the other was specific for blood types A and B (2010/9/3) 7 . We were told by the bank that they chose message recipients in its administrative database according to the extent of shortage and the perceived likelihood to respond to the message, while such likelihood was judged by observable donor characteristics such as blood type, number of previous donations, and time of last donation that we have access to. The two messages were sent to 7,858 and 3,102 past donors respectively 8 . A small number of these mobile messages (<0.1%) failed in delivery due to expired mobile numbers or weak signal. These failed messages were excluded from our analysis.
Perceived as the last resort, FR donation was not used until the second quarter of 2010, when increasing medical demand and a few idiosyncratic shocks lead to a blood shortage hard to solve by other methods. In practice, FR is implemented by hospitals. When the bank could not offer enough blood to a hospital but allows the hospital to acquire blood supply from FR donations, the hospital will explain FR to the patient. If the patient is able to persuade her family and friends to donate, the donor will go to the nearest street mobile and tell the on-board nurse that his donation is for a specific patient in a specific hospital. All FR donations are then sent back to the centralized blood bank for screening and processing. At the same time, processed 7 We excluded a small number of shortage messages for O-negative blood in our analysis because of the small sample size (O-negative accounts for 0.45% of our donor pool) and its uniqueness (public good for a much smaller group). Although, in theory, O type blood can be used for patients of other blood types, in practice hospitals rarely conduct any cross-type blood transfusion. 8 We have carefully checked the national and local news around those two dates, and found those two dates are not related to major events including accidents (e.g. explosion) or natural disasters (e.g. earthquakes). In addition, both messages mentioned that the blood shortage is due to a recent surge in blood usage specific to blood type x, rather than emergency. We thank one reviewer for suggesting the check. blood products (from other donors' donation) are immediately allocated to the patient from the bank inventory. Of the total 447,357 donation episodes, 57.48% are voluntary donations at street mobiles, 38.38% are voluntary donations at group drives, and the remaining 4.14% are FR donations. Figure 2 shows the variation over time between voluntary and FR donations. Table 1 and Table 2 further summarize the data according to whether a donor received any treatment message and whether a donor made any FR donation. By headcount, 10,960 donors received at least one of the two shortage messages specific to blood type and never donated FR throughout. Compared to the full sample of donors who are on average young, male, single and without local residential permit (hukou), message receivers are on average older, less educated, and slightly more likely to be female, single, and local. By definition, shortage messages were only sent to existing donors. Among the 10,960 message recipients during the sample period, 7,457 have donated once before getting the message, 1,887 have donated twice, and 1,616 have donated three or more times.
Of the 18,324 donors that had ever made FR donation, the majority (17,276) never donated anything before their FR donation. We refer to them as no-history FR donors. The rest of the FR donors (1,048) are existing donors, among whom 654 donated once before making the FR donation, 200 donated twice, and 194 donated three or more times. Compared to all donors or those receiving the shortage message, FR donors, especially the no-history FR donors, are older and more likely to be local and married. This suggests that FR attracts very different types of populations compared to the shortage message or voluntary donation in general.
In contrast to the WHO concern but consistent with the literature Stutzer, 2008, Lacetera et al. 2012 ), we did not find negative evidence on blood safety. The blood quality is comparable between FR and voluntary donors (96.08% vs 95.67%), although the quality of nohistory FR donations (95.74%) is slightly lower than that of existing FR donations (97.97%).
Those who received a shortage message also donate blood of similar quality (97.68%), compared to other donors.
Both FR donors and the treatment message recipients donate a greater amount per episode than the rest of the sample, probably because they know some of their donations target an immediate shortage. We do not often observe the same individual receiving two treatment messages (501), making more than one FR donation (87), or receiving any of the two treatment messages and donating FR anytime throughout the sample (89). We delete these donors from analysis.
Tradeoffs of the Non-price Methods
From the bank's point of view, SM and FR have different pros and cons in solving blood shortage. First, the blood bank can choose exactly to whom and when to send the shortage message, but the FR depends on the random arrival rate of patients and the patients' ability to recruit potential donors. Second, if the FR program is able to generate additional donations in the short run, they are proportional to the level of shortage. In contrast, the donation amount from the shortage message is more uncertain. Third, the shortage message targets existing donors only, but the FR program can motivate donations from individuals who have never donated before or would never donate voluntarily in the future. By specifying the immediate recipient of the donation (a friend/family member in need of blood), FR treatment can generate even more of a warm glow from FR donors (Fong and Luttmer 2009, List and Price 2009) . Such a warm glow may last in the long run and expand beyond one's close social network. Finally, FR shifts the burden of donor recruitment from the blood bank to individual patients, which could cut the cost of recruitment by 75 to 87 percent. 9
Neither the shortage message nor FR donation is immune from the risk of reducing the blood supply in the long run. Specifically, this downside risk may arise through two mechanisms.
First, theoretically and empirically, economists have shown that some individuals are conditional cooperators who are more willing to contribute to a public good when they learn that others do so as well. 10 In our context, both the shortage message and FR donation convey credible information about others' (insufficient) donation and therefore could reduce the incentive to donate among those who value conditional cooperation. We refer to this effect as "conditional cooperation." Moreover, the FR program allows blood donations to be shared with family/friends rather than with the general public. While this could reduce one's incentive to free ride, it may also create an incentive to save the blood for one's small social circle and crowd out the incentive to donate for the society. We refer to this substitution effect between the intrinsic motivation for the public and the private incentive for one's own friends and family as a "substitution." Second, the FR program also raises a concern about blood quality. The implementation of the FR program could encourage desperate patients to hire professional donors as "friends" and thus jeopardize blood quality. For this reason, the WHO recommends phasing out FR donation and eliminating paid donation. Nevertheless, researchers have found mixed evidence regarding 9 As shown in Bates et al. (2007) , the cost of getting blood from voluntary donors recruited and screened at transfusion centers is four to eight times as much as the cost of obtaining blood from hospital-based FR donation. It is usually the bank's responsibility to find voluntary donors, whereas the burden of finding FR donors falls on the patient's family. 10 See Andreoni (1988) and Fischbacher et al. (2001) for theoretical models on conditional cooperation and reciprocity. See Fischbacher et al. (2001) , Potters et al.(2005) , Frey and Meier (2004) for lab evidence, and Croson (2008, 2009 ), Martin and Randal (2008) , Allcott (2011) , and Shang and Cronson (2008) , Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) for evidence from empirical analysis and field experiments. the blood quality of FR donors: on one hand, Abdel-Messih et al. (2014) use Egyptian data to show that the prevalence of transfusion-transmissible infections is much higher among FR donors than among voluntary donors; on the other hand, Allain et al. (2010) compare FR donors with first-time voluntary donors in West Africa and find their blood quality to be similar.
From a policy maker's point of view, it is essential to understand the tradeoff between these downside risks and the positive benefits arising from SM and FR in both the short and long runs, before deciding when to pursue which method to alleviate shortage. Next section articulates the potential effects of SM and FR on treated individuals, and how we identify these effects econometrically.
Potential Behavioral Effects
In principle, both SM and FR can be applied to existing donors and those that have never donated before the intervention time (referred to as no-history donors). In practice, blood banks, including the one in our study, often target messages toward existing donors (see the discussion of such practice in previous studies, Lacetera et al. 2014) , and implement FR quietly for both existing and no-history donors conditional on their families or friends needing blood in a hospital and there being a blood shortage at the time.
Effects of Shortage Message
For existing donors, SM can have a mixed effect on willingness to donate. On the positive side, shortage implies that the donated blood can be used immediately on someone that needs blood, which increases the donor's perceived benefits from unpaid voluntary donation. The perceived benefitswhich we refer to as the warm glowmay come from pure altruism or a warm feeling of doing good for people in need, both of which may be more salient in the case of a type-specific shortage. Note that the extra 'warm glow' from donating in response to a shortage message is tied to that specific shortage and therefore is likely to be a short-run effect. The warm glow effect of the shortage message may also differ by donor type, which could be characterized by the number of voluntary donations a donor made before the intervention time (D). Let us call donors with D>1 frequent donors and donors with D=1 infrequent donors. If frequent donors donate more frequently because they derive more of a warm glow from voluntary donation, the shortage message may generate more of a warm glow for them than for infrequent donors.
On the negative side, shortage may change an existing donor's belief regarding how the rest of the community contributes to the public good. If the donor believes that shortage occurs because the rest of the community contributes too little, she may become less motivated for future donation (Frey and Meier 2004) . This conditional cooperation can occur in both the short and long runs. There could also be a substitution effect: if a donor has planned to donate 10 months later but decides to donate early in response to the shortage message, the message may simply substitute a future donation with a current donation 11 . Above all, if the data offer an exogenous variation in shortage message, and we can find control donor(s) for every treated donor that receives this exogenous message, the sign of the aggregate effect should be informative as to the competition between the above-mentioned effects. In particular, the effect will be positive in the short run and zero afterwards if the warm glow dominates over conditional cooperation and there is no substitution. If conditional cooperation is the main effect, the aggregate effect should be negative in both the short and long runs. If substitution exists (in combination with the warm glow in the short run), we expect the aggregate effect to be positive in the short run and negative in the long run.
Effects of Family Replacement
FR is more complicated than SM. In addition to conveying shortage, a record of FR donation implies another two pieces of information. First, the donor knows that her FR donation benefits a family or friend rather than an unknown stranger. As suggested in previous literature, individuals are typically more altruistic towards family and friends or derive greater warm glow from social ties (Fong and Luttmer 2009 , List and Price 2009 , Leider et.al. 2009 ). By donating to one's own friend or family member, the FR donor has an opportunity to closely observe the benefit of donation for the blood recipient both before and after transfusion. Hence, the warm glow effect of FR can be greater and more long lasting than that of a shortage message alone. However, the same reason could generate a substitution effect in the future. If one knows that she can dedicate her blood to family and friends when they need it, she may have an incentive to save the blood for her own social circle in the future instead of donating it to the general public. In this sense, the FR program may introduce the danger of reducing the pool of risk sharing and undermining the efficiency of risk pooling.
The second piece of information conveyed by an FR donation record is selection. In principle, the treatment we are interested in is being asked to make an FR donation for a specific patient 12 . However, because FR donation will not occur unless the FR donor has agreed to donate upon request, FR donation is subject to unobserved selection 13 . The magnitude of selection is crucial for the overall evaluation of an FR program. At one extreme, if FR donors are so motivated that they would have donated voluntarily to the blood bank even if they had not received the FR request, the FR program does not increase the blood supply at all. At the other extreme, if all FR donors are those that will not donate to the blood bank but will donate for their own family and friends, these FR donations will sustain the demand from their family and friends and free up same amount of blood for the rest of the community. We provide detailed discussion on how to account for such for selection and identify the effect of FR in Section 4.2.
Econometric Identification

Identification Strategy for Shortage Message
The econometric model to identify the effect of SM is a straightforward difference-indifferences (DID). We believe a control group is needed for each individual message receiver for two reasons. First, when the bank chose whom to send the SM to, it explicitly targeted the donors that they believe are more likely to respond according to observable donor attributes in the bank's administrative database. This is why the SM recipients appear different from the general donor pool in Tables 1 and 2 . Because the bank cannot recall exactly which observable attributes it had used in selecting recipients for both SMs, it is important to match treated and control individuals in observables as much as we can. Secondly, there could be significant social, economic, health, or cultural changes before and after the mobile messages that affect different demographic groups differently. This concern is especially valid when we look into the long run effect of SM, which could be as long as two years after SM. Using a close match that appears identical to the treated individual in observable demographics will help us minimize the impact of these time-varying confounding factors.
Specifically, we first match a treated individual with individual(s) that have the same demographics and donation history as but do not receive the message, calling the pair group .
As detailed below, because the studied shortage messages are specific to certain blood types (A and B), we limit control individuals to other blood types (O and AB). To the extent that typespecific shortage is exogenous and people of different blood types are comparable conditional on the same demographics and donation history, we have a clean comparison within each treatedcontrol pair. We then run a typical DID regression, where denotes whether donates voluntarily at time , 1 , is a dummy for the treated individuals, and 1 , is a set of dummies equal to one if is in a specific half year at or after the time of the message, the coefficient , may vary across different time periods:
One caveat of the above identification strategy is that we compare the effect of receiving a shortage message and the effect of receiving no message. Strictly speaking, receiving a shortage message entails two treatments: one is receiving a message that simply asks for voluntary donation, and we refer to this as an "ask" treatment; the other is acquiring information about ongoing blood shortage (specific to a blood type), and we refer to this as a "shortage" treatment.
The identified coefficient of captures both treatments. If the bank's goal is to compare the mobile message and the FR program, it does not need to distinguish between the two treatment effects of the shortage message. However, for research purposes, distinguishing the two treatment effects will highlight the extra effect of emphasizing "shortage" on top of the simple effect of "ask."
As documented in Sun et al. (2015) , the same blood bank conducted a randomized field experiment in 2014, in which the baseline treatment was sending a mobile message that asked for voluntary donation without any mention of shortage. Compared to the control group of no message at all, this treatment generated a positive 0.275% effect on the probability of donation.
To the extent that this treatment effect captures the pure effect of "ask" and is comparable to the "ask effect" of the shortage message studied here 14 , the effect of the "shortage" treatment was -0.275%.
Identification Strategy for Family Replacement
The econometric challenge for FR is how to distinguish the selection effect from the treatment effect of FR (a combination of warm glow, conditional cooperation, and substitution effects).
14 The comparison between the SMs in our sample and the SM in Sun et al. (2015) is imperfect. The SMs in our sample were implemented by the bank without any involvement of academic researchers. Thus, they were not as explicitly randomized as that of Sun et al. (2015) . We were told that the bank typically narrows down the list of message recipients according to the extent of shortage and several observable donor characteristics in the bank's database such as blood type, number of previous donations, and time of last donation. Since we have access to the whole database of the bank, our matching algorithm will identify controls that have the same observables as the message recipients and should minimize the potential selection on message recipients. Another imperfection is that the compared SMs were sent out at different times. Our comparison is reliant on the assumption that the overall response to SMs would be similar except for the fact that the message used in Sun et al. (2015) did not mention shortage while the messages studied here were explicit in shortage.
For an FR donor that has donated via FR at time t (denoted as = 1), let us assume she carried demographics Xi and a donation history (Hi) before t. There are Mi number of FR donors that have exactly the same { , , }. In our donation records, we find Wi individuals that had the same Xi and Hi before t but did not donate FR. Among these Mi+Wi individuals, had the FR not existed, a fraction (i) would have donated voluntarily at t, while the rest (1-i) would not have donated at t. The first type (referred to as V type) might be more motivated than the second (referred to as N type) in donating blood. These two types of donors, if unaware of FR, will donate in the future with probabilities and respectively. For simplicity, let Δ denote − , the expected donation rate of the two types of non-FR donors (after t) can be expressed as:
Suppose the risk of having a family or friend in need of blood ( ) is the same for everyone, but the likelihood of agreeing to donate FR is V for V type and N for N type. Thus, by selection, the ratio of FR donors that have the same { , } by t is
Conditional on being an FR donor at t, the probability of donating after t is the sum of the selection effect and a combination of warm glow, conditional cooperation and substitution effects ( ):
Apparently, the selection effect, as reflected in the last term, reflects the extent to which the FR donors (at time t) consist of disproportionally more V-type people than in the population.
Denoting Δ = , adding an i.i.d error term and rewriting the above in vectors, we have the expected donation rate after t for three types of donors (FR donors, non-FR V-type, and non-FR N-type) as:
In equation (2), the term is the warm glow/conditional cooperation/substitution effect that applies to each FR donor equally. The last non-error term is the selection effect, of which Δ is identifiable from the warm glow/conditional cooperation/substitution effect of FR because the selection effect depends on , the proportion of type V in the { , } population. If we can have a good proxy for 1− , equation (2) can be run in linear specifications. One rough proxy for 1− is the ratio of type V to type N in non-FR donors, which in theory follows:
.
It is not perfect because the non-FR population is already a result of selection, although the selection is arguably small if is very small. Another possibility is computing this ratio before FR is introduced. Empirically, we can calculate the hazard ratio of donating voluntarily at a certain time condition on { , }; this ratio will be a proxy of from which we can easily calculate 1− . Once we identify Δ , Δ , and 1− , the total selection effect of FR (relative to type N) can be computed as:
In the case of no FR, the average voluntary donation per capita will be:
By definition, type V will donate voluntarily at t for sure and type N will not donate voluntarily at t. This explains why , is just the proportion of type V, which is .
If FR is introduced for all donors with { , } at t conditional on their family or friends being in need of blood (the probability of this event is ), the average supply per capita at t and after t will be:
Because type V will denote voluntarily without FR anyway, we will assume type V will always donate upon an FR request, i.e. =1. Under this assumption, the extra supply due to FR can be written as:
In words, the ability of FR to increase blood supply at t depends on the extent to which FR can hit on type N donors and the rate of converting this hit into donations. 
Summary for Identifications
In summary, we present econometric models to estimate the causal effect of SM and FR.
Two items are worth highlighting: first, receiving SM is not bundled with whether or not one responds to the message, which makes the econometrics clean and simple. But FR donation bundles the receipt of an FR request and a positive response to that request, which is why we need to consider selection in FR donation. Second, the shortage message was sent to existing donors, while FR could hit both existing and no-history donors. Consequently, the effectiveness of FR depends not only on the effect of FR on future donation behavior, but also on the extent to which the FR request hits no-history donors. This is because no-history donors are by definition more likely to be free riders 15 on the society, and FR serves as a way to motivate these free riders to contribute. We will come back to the magnitude of this effect after we present our data and coefficient estimates.
Sample construction
We now describe how we use matching to construct our analysis samples for SM and FR respectively. where is the start of our sample period and r is the half year in which the treated individual received a treatment message. To be conservative, we focus on the pool of controls with zero distance to the treated (ED ij = 0). In the second step, among those with zero distance, we search for donors that share the same gender, age (18-21, 22-25, 26-30, 31-40, and 40+) , education (bachelor degree or not), marital status (married or not) and hukou location (in the city, elsewhere in the same province, other province, or unknown) with the treated donor.
For the second treatment message (specific to type B), it is possible that a treated donor received other non-blood-type-specific shortage message(s) in January 2010 before this treatment. Therefore, for donors subject to this treatment, we also match the controls by whether they received the same non-treatment shortage message(s) in January 2010. It turns out that any treated donors that also received non-treatment message(s) in January 2010 cannot find a zerodistance match at all, which implies that they are excluded from the message-analysis sample.
The first two rows of Table 3 summarize the count of treated and control donors for the two message treatments. Specifically, 3,102 donors received the message specific to blood types A and B, and we can find at least one zero-distance controls for 1,749 of them. Another 7,858 donors received the B-specific message, of which 6,291 have zero-distance controls. On average, each treated donor receiving a shortage message has 4 to 5 control donors.
Matching for FR donors
A similar matching algorithm applies to the FR treatment. Any individual that made one FR donation throughout our sample period is defined as a treated donor. Those who donated FR more than once, or donated FR once and received any of the two shortage messages are excluded from the analysis. A treated donor may be an existing FR donor or a no-history FR donor.
For an existing FR donor who donated voluntarily before the FR donation, we search in our database of donors for those who have exactly the same donation history and demographics before the treatment half year. The matching algorithm is the same as above.
For a no-history FR donor , there are two types of controls. The first type includes those who did not donate before the half year of the FR event but donated voluntarily at or after the event time. We can find them in our donor database by the above matching algorithm. Let us refer to them as type-1 control and denote their count as 1 . The second type of control includes those who never donated to the blood bank throughout our sample period. By definition, they do not appear in our database of donors. To locate them, we resort to the demographic summary from the 2005 census of the city, which tells us the percentage of city residents ( 2 ) that have the same age, gender, education, marital status and hukou location as . 16 Assuming the composition of demographics is stable over time, we first calculate the number of city residents in that 's demographic cell at time as 2 = * 2 and then calculate the number of people in the cell that was at the city at the FR time but may have migrated out of the city at or before time
( 2 ). 17 It is important to count the emigrants in the control group because the treated individuals could have moved out of the city after the FR donation but remain in the bank's database. 18 Within 2 + 2 , some may have donated to the blood bank before the treated FR time (regardless of whether their donation is FR or not); let us denote their count as 0 . Then the count of type-2 control for can be expressed as 2 + 2 − 0 − 1 . Although these people do not appear in our database of donors, we add them back to the database by imputing their donation dummy at each half year as zero.
Of the 17,276 no-history FR donors, the majority (17,171) have valid type-1 control donors, with on average 7 type-1 controls per treated donor. The number of type-2 controls is on average 175,341 per treated donor at the event half year (the median is 62,283). Compared to nohistory FR donors, the matching rate is lower for existing FR donors, especially if they had already donated multiple times before the FR donation. This is not surprising because in total only 4.5% of the 8+ million population of the city have ever donated to the blood bank. In total, out of 1,048 existing FR donors, we are able to find controls for 827 of them, with an average of 102 controls per treated donor.
In terms of demographics, no-history FR donors are different from both message recipients and existing FR donors. In particular, no-history FR donors are more likely to be middle-aged, married, and male. People with different donation history before the message or FR treatment are also different in demographics: typically, those who had a longer donation history before treatment are younger and more likely male, college-educated and with hukou within the same province. Given these differences in observable demographics, we believe donors with 16 We are grateful to Chong Liu at Tsinghua University for providing the count of population by demographics. 17 We estimate each year's cell-specific emigration rate according to the question "How long have you been away from your hukou place?" as recorded in the 2005 census. Because we can only access the 2005 census through a random sample, we pool certain demographic cells so that we have enough observations to calculate the emigration rate. The adjustments only apply to those cells without local residential permits. The total population for a specific cell is accumulated over time 18 Excluding the emigrants does not affect our qualitative results on FR donation but increases the magnitude of our key estimates. We believe that part of that magnitude is driven by emigrants, so the reported results including emigrants are more conservative and precise. different donation history may differ in unobservable attributes as well, some of which (e.g. the warm feeling from donation) could trigger different responses to our message or FR treatment.
Estimation Results
In this section, we first focus on donation rate and donation amount in response to SM and FR separately. Given the WHO concerns about blood quality, results related to blood quality are presented at the end of this section. Second, previous studies have examined the effect of a mailed flyer with information only about blood donation but find no significant increase in voluntary donation (Iajya et al. 2013) . Third, in a separate study, the same blood bank conducted a large randomized field experiment in 2014 involving 80,000 participants. One treatment in that experiment was sending existing donors a simple reminder message that requests donation but does not mention a shortage. Compared to a control group with no message, Sun, Gao and Jin (2015) find that sending out a simple reminder message leads to only a 0.275 percentage point increase in donation rate. A direct comparison might not be straightforward because the messages in the two studies were sent out at different times and the effect of messages were identified using different empirical approaches (observational data versus field experiment). However, under the assumptions that donor response to "ask" is stable over time and our matching process fully controls how the bank selected the message recipients in this study 22 , the much larger effect we found in the shortage messages (1.8% versus 0.275%) is likely attributable to the shortage information in the SMs. This suggests that informing donors of a shortage is an important tool to induce a warm glow and increase donations.
Effects of SM on donation rate and donation amount
The rest of Table 4 shows the heterogeneous effect of shortage messages. If we split the sample by whether the treated donor donated once (infrequent) or more than once (repeat) before receiving a shortage message, the message has a much bigger effect on repeat donors (4.2% increase in donation rate, roughly 15.64ml) than on infrequent donors (1.3%, 3.88ml). As discussed in the literature (Lacetera et al. 2014) , the fact that frequent donors donate more even before the message suggests they might derive more of a warm glow from donation and/or face a lower donation cost. Since shortage information does not change donation cost, one likely explanation is that shortage generates more of a warm glow for frequent donors. Such finding is also aligned with the recent study by Bruhin et al. (2015) , which finds phone call leads to a 9.9% increase for the most motivated donors and 5.9% for less motivated donors with low baseline donation rate. Consistently, because a shortage is specific to the message time, we find no longrun effect of the shortage message either on repeat donors or infrequent donors. In other words, the shortage message does not generate a long-lasting warm glow, nor does it crowd out donations in the future. Another explanation is that crowding-out effect and habit formation effect may cancel out, as separately discussed in Bruhin et al. (2015) . In an unreported table, we also rerun Table 4 for the two shortage messages separately. Both shortage messages motivate an increase in donation rate at t=0 and nothing afterwards. The magnitude of the increase in donation rate is 1.2% (p=0.156) for the first message and 1.9% (p<0.001) for the second one. The estimates are similar in magnitude, but only statistically significant for the second message, probably because that message involves many more treated donors in our after-match sample (6,291 versus 1,749).
Finally, it is interesting to compare the effects of SM with that of economic incentives (Lacetera et al. 2014 , Sun et al. 2015 . The positive effect of a shortage message at the aggregate level is sizable (1.8%), compared to the reported increase (0.8%) for a $15 dollar gift in Lacetera et al. 2014 . Consistent with the literature, we also find a larger increase for individuals who donated more often; such a differential effect is expected since experienced donors can gain more warm glow from donating at the time of shortage and may have lower cost of time (Lacetera et al. 2014 ).
Effects of FR on donation rate and donation amount
As articulated in Section 4, it is more challenging to evaluate the causal effect of FR donation on an FR donor's future donation incentives and the blood bank's total blood supply. In particular, because FR donors might be a selected group, as donors who would donate without FR may be more likely to respond positively to the FR request. Our model can help tease out such a selection effect. The donation rate of no-history donors jumps back to nearly zero right after the FR donation, which is below the donation rate of their corresponding controls at t=1 but comparable to the controls at t>=2. One possible explanation is that the experience of FR donation triggered conditional cooperation or substitution effects among no-history FR donors.
The picture for the existing FR donors presents quite a contrast. By construction, these FR donors and their controls have the same donation history before time 0. Both groups had a dip at t=-1, because donors are not allowed to donate again until six months after the last donation. At time 0, the FR donors donated 100% (by definition), while less than 10% of their controls donated voluntarily. After time 0, the FR donors continue to have a slightly higher donation rate than their controls, and this difference seems to persist from t=1 to t=5 (i.e. more than two years and half). One potential explanation is selection: the existing donors that agree to donate FR may donate anyway even without the FR program. If this is the case, FR donations from these donors have little effect on the bank's current and future blood supply. Another explanation is that the warm glow generated by the FR experience dominates the potential negative effects (conditional cooperation and substitution) in the long run, encouraging the existing FR donors to donate even more in the future. This could have a beneficial effect on future blood supply, even if the FR donors are a selected group.
Regression results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . Table 5 presents the differences-indifferences results for no-history and existing FR donors separately, without controlling for potential selection in the acceptance of FR request. Table 6 controls for selection. In all tables, we use ordinary least square regressions and the dependent variable is whether a donor donates in a particular half calendar year.
The first three columns of Table 5 focus on no-history FR donors. Recall that we have two types of controls for them: type-1 control donors did not donate before t=0, but donated at or after t=0; type-2 control donors are the part of the city population that have the same demographics as a no-history FR donor but never donated whole blood throughout our data period. To include both types of controls, we first collapse controls per treated donor into one observation per half-year and then run the OLS regression with donor fixed effects and half-year fixed effects. Column 1 shows that FR generated close to one donation at t=0 (0.729, driven by definition of FR donors) and 0.055 fewer donations per half year after t=0. Column 2 further breaks down the post-FR period into t=1, t=2 and t>=3. The negative effect at t=1 is bigger than the other two periods (-8.8% versus -4.5% and -3.3%), which is understandable as there is a natural attrition after a donation, and even regular donors may prefer to donate once a year rather than twice a year. Translating the effect on donation rate into donation amount, Column 3 shows that the FR treatment generates 245.6ml more blood supply per donor at t=0, and 17.8ml less per donor per half-year after t=0.
The last three columns of Table 5 report the parallel regression results for existing FR donors. Column 4 shows a large positive coefficient for existing FR donors at t=0 (0.958, driven by definition). Contrary to the case for no-history FR donors, the coefficient for existing FR donors after t=0 is positive (2.9%). Column 5 decomposes the post-event period into t=1, t=2 and t>=3. It shows that the positive effect on FR donors is 2.1% at t=1, becomes stronger at t=2
(4.7%) and then comes back to 2.2% at t>=3. The stronger effect at t=2 than t=1 can be explained by the fact that many repeat donors donate once a year and therefore there is a natural attrition half a year after the last donation. The positive effect at t>=3 suggests a long-lasting effect of FR encouraging existing FR donors to donate more in the future. The last column of Table 6 shows that the positive effect of FR on existing FR donors creates 332.2ml blood supply per donor at t=0 and 10.3ml extra blood supply per half-year per donor after t=0.
The positive long-run effect of FR on existing donors is an interesting contrast to the lack of longrun effect from shortage messages. This is possible because giving blood to a close social connection may create an extra warm glow (Fong and Luttmer 2009) and the close tie with the patient during and after patient recovery could reinforce that warm glow in the long run. This strong warm glow can also dominate conditional cooperation and substitution in the long run.
To distinguish selection from the true FR effect on future blood supply, Table 6 follows the econometric structure presented in Section 4. The first two columns look at donation rate and donation amount for no-history FR donors; the last two columns look at the same dependent variables for existing FR donors. As we expect, there is a significant selection effect among existing FR donors, while the selection effect for no-history FR donors is close to non-existent. This is probably because we have more variations in the fraction of donors donating voluntarily at time zero () among the controls of existing FR donors than among the controls of no-history FR donors. In particular, the selection coefficient (Δ = ), which is defined as the ratio between the likelihood of type V donors accepting the FR request versus the likelihood of type N accepting, turns out to be 0.111/0.063=1.76 for existing FR donors, with a p-value between 5%
and 10%. If we assume = 1 (because type V donors are defined to be willing to donate at time 0 even without an FR request), this number implies that type N donors will donate with a likelihood = 56.76% upon an FR request. We will use this number to conduct a back-ofenvelope calculation of the effect of FR on the total blood supply. In comparison, for no-history FR donors, Table 6 shows a slightly negative but statistically zero difference in the voluntary donation rate of type-V and type-N people (Δ ), which suggests little selection and makes it meaningless to calculate Δ from the estimates of Δ • Δ and Δ . In light of this, our back-ofenvelope calculation will assume different values of (hence different Δ as we assume = 1) for robustness check.
After isolating the selection effect, the rest of Table 6 shows that the causal effect of FR on future donation rate, or , is negative for no-history FR donors (-0.036) but positive for existing FR donors (0.029), which translates into -11.53ml less per half-year per no-history FR donor and 10.15ml more per half-year per existing FR donor. Our study is among the first to identify a significant post-intervention effect for blood donation ). Very interestingly, we find that there is a motivation loss for those donors who donate less in the past, while there is an increase in voluntary donation for donors who are overall donating more. Very interestingly, we find that there is a motivation loss for those donors who donate less in the past, while there is an increase in voluntary donation for donors who are overall donating more.
Alternative Specification of Duration Model
We use a Cox proportional hazard model with multiple-failures to test the robustness of our OLS results. 23 As in the OLS model, our data consist of the matched samples. The dependent variable is the duration until the event of interest, i.e. either the next donation or the end of our observation. Table 7 reports the hazard ratios of variables of primary interests. Column (1) tests the impact of SM while Column (2) examines the impact of FR for donors with a donation history. Both specifications have error clustered by donor. We estimate the duration model on a matching sample. 24 To estimate the duration model, we dropped all donors' first record from the sample because donors started their records by blood donation. In other words, all donors experienced a failure at the beginning of their available history. Using these starting records in the survival analysis may bias the results. 25 It is noteworthy that we cannot run the duration model for the FR donors without a donation history, because we are unable to weight the massive control group for the dependent variable. Overall, the duration models presented in Table 7 suggest similar patterns as in the OLS model: donors that received a shortage message are more likely to donate in the short run but not in the long run; while the FR donors (with some donation history before FR) are more likely to donate after the FR period.
In this study, we use OLS as the main specification for both SM and FR analyses because 
Effect of SM and FR on blood quality
Defining a quality dummy equal to one if the donated blood passes the standard battery of blood tests, Table 8 regresses this dummy on the treatment status by t=0 and t>0 separately for each treatment group (message treatment, no-history FR donors, and existing FR donors). We choose to run the regression for t=0 and t>0 separately because blood quality information is not available until a blood donation exists; hence, any regression on blood quality must be conditional on a subsample of donation dummy equal to one. This subsample may differ by time, which makes the across-time comparison hard to interpret. In light of this, for each particular time period (t=0 or t>0), the regression gives us a straightforward quality comparison between the treated and control donors, conditional on both donating at the time. Again, we collapse the controls so that each treated and control pair gets the same weight. 26 The split population duration (SPD) model is another candidate (Box-Steffensmeier et al, 2005) . Standard duration models assume that every unit will eventually donate, which may be unreasonable or unrealistic. The SPD model relaxes this assumption. It also allows for clustering (but not random effects). For our data, the SPD model does not converge due to flat region for the difficulty to compute derivatives. Researchers with similar data may find it worthwhile to consider SPD, if they can overcome the computational difficulty. 27 Clustering the error by donor is not equivalent to including donor random effects. We have tried both for the Cox proportional hazard duration model. The model with donor random effects does not converge, that is why Table 7 only reports results from the Cox model with error clustering. Table 8 do not support the WHO's concern about blood quality: for both message recipients and FR donors, there is no significant quality difference between treated and control donors at both t=0 and t>0.
Results in
Discussion and Future Research
In this paper we have shown that both SM and FR can mitigate blood shortages in the short run with little compromise of blood quality. However, these methods target different audiences, have different effects in the long run, and affect different donors differently.
From the blood bank's point of view, what are the key tradeoffs between SM and FR? We identify four potential tradeoffs for consideration when implementing non-price methods to address shortage. The first tradeoff lies in the extent of control. A blood bank can fully control who receives a SM and how many receive it, but the recruitment of FR donors is outsourced to patients. This implies that a SM may be more effective if the bank is short of a specific type of blood and the bank has a large pool of existing donors to choose from. That being said, a direct message allows less control over timing, as the blood bank cannot force donors to donate at a specific time. In contrast, FR may be more helpful in mitigating the shortage facing a particular patient at a particular time.
The second tradeoff between SM and FR relates to their targeted audiences. While a mobile message can easily reach existing donors, it is difficult to reach those who have not donated to the bank already. In theory, the bank could announce a blood shortage on TV, radio, newspaper, or the Internet, but such broadcasting is less targeted and may be crowded out by other information, which introduces more uncertainty and is likely less effective than sending mobile messages to individual donors. In comparison, an FR program relies on individual patients to reach out to their own social connections, which could bring in a large number of donors who may otherwise never donate voluntarily. These no-history individuals may be more willing to donate to their friends or family than to a stranger. As shown in our data, the FR approach indeed brings an additional source of blood supply, which could be more effective in increasing a blood supply quickly when the population of voluntary donors is small and decreasing.
The third tradeoff concerns the differential effects in the short run and long run. Similar to economic incentives, SM is highly effective in the short run but does not increase donation in the long run. Interestingly, FR can increase the donation from existing donors in the long run but at the same time lead to a small motivation loss for new donors in the long term. Fortunately, such a decrease for new donors is very small and can be well justified by the selection effect, i.e. additional (one-time) donation from those no-history donors.
Finally, blood banks also need to compare the implementation costs of both programs. As discussed before, FR shifts the burden of donor recruitment from the blood bank to individual patients, which could cut the cost of recruitment by 75 to 87 percent according to Bates et al. (2007) . In contrast, sending a shortage message has a small cost (about 1.2 US dollar/100 messages) for the bank in our study. Table 6 , the no-history donors will reduce 390.3 donations per half-year after FR and the existing FR donors will bring 15.3 more donations per half-year after FR. Summing over the effect for five years (from t=0 to t=9), introducing FR to half of the patients is much more effective in increasing blood supply than sending out a shortage messages to all existing donors (7956.4 vs 3,240 donations). In other words, in order to generate the same effect on the overall blood supply within the next five years, sending out shortage messages to all existing donors is equivalent to introducing the FR to 20.36% of the sick patients facing a shortage. If the goal is to generate the same blood supply in the short run (t=0 only), then sending out shortage messages to all existing donors is equivalent to introducing the FR to 14.3% of the sick patients.
In the second block of Table 9 , we change the percent of the donating population to 10%, which reduces the gap between the two methods. If we increase it further to 15%, the shortage message becomes more effective than the FR program in increasing blood supply over five years (the third block of Table 9 ).
In Table 10 , we redo the back-of-envelope calculation for the first block of Overall, the back-of-envelope calculation suggests that SM can be used in places where the donor population is large and the shortage is small. In comparison, FR could be more useful when the voluntary donation rate is low, the shortage is severe, and the FR-takeup rate is relatively high among those who never donated before. In this sense, our data suggests a more optimistic picture for FR than the WHO recommendation. However, in a society with a low donation rate (which could be the reason for a severe shortage to begin with), most FR donors will be no-history FR donors, and the FR treatment may discourage voluntary donation in the long run by generating either negative cooperation or substitution. Although a broader introduction of FR can generate more blood supply in the short run, it may exacerbate a shortage problem in the long run. Like the WHO, we reach a cautious conclusion about FR programs but for a reason other than quality concerns 29 .
Future research may take several different directions. First, the shortage messages studied in this paper target donors that have donated before. Previous studies have found that an emergency appeal (such as after a disaster) is also effective in driving new donors (Reich et al. 2006, Ryzhov et al. forthcoming) . Future studies can extend our work to study the impact of a shortage message on non-donors.
Second, we empirically show that shortage information can have a large and positive effect on blood donation in the short run. This finding has immediate managerial implications for blood banks that wish to alleviate shortages. However, theoretically we cannot differentiate the 29 Another reason to be cautious in generalizing our findings is that FR may become less effective when being used on a more regular basis rather than exclusively during severe shortages. A patient puts more effort in recruiting FR donors when FR request is only made under very severe shortage (rather than on a regular basis). We thank our reviewer for suggesting this possibility.
importance of two potential mechanisms: pure altruism and the warm feeling of doing good for others. Future studies can employ theory-driven lab experiments (Crumpler and Grossman 2008) or field experiments (DellaVigna et al. 2012) to test the underlying mechanisms behind this effect.
Similarly, we identify a significant long-run effect of FR on blood donation; such a longrun effect differs for existing donors and new donors. We believe this interesting evidence can be explained by FR generating a long-lasting warm glow for existing FR donors but negative cooperation or an incentive to save blood for friends and family among no-history FR donors.
More studies are needed to confirm this explanation. Donors whose first donation is affected by family replacement 28 Note: * For those whose first donation is FR, the number of controls refer to type 1 control. The average type 2 control is 175,341 at the time of FR, the median is 62283. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by treatment-control group, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All specifications include donor fixed effects and half year dummies. Unit of time = half year Population = 4,000,000 % ever donated before treatment time = 4.5%, 10% or 15% % shortage = % of population that needs blood at a specific t -% donate = 1% (existing donors) = % of type-V existing donors (i.e. those that will donate voluntarily at a specific t) = 4% (existing donors) = % of type-V existing donors that will donate upon FR request = 1 (existing donors) = % of type-N existing donors that will donate upon FR request =56.76% (no-history) = % of type-V no-history donors (i.e. those that will donate voluntarily at a specific t) = 0 (no history) = % of no-history donors that will donate upon FR request =56.76% Unit of time = half year Population = 4,000,000 % ever donated before treatment time = 4.5%, 10% or 15% % shortage = % of population that needs blood at a specific t -% donate = 1% (existing donors) = % of type-V existing donors (i.e. those that will donate voluntarily at a specific t) = 4% (existing donors) = % of type-V existing donors that will donate upon FR request = 1 (existing donors) = % of type-N existing donors that will donate upon FR request =56.76% (no-history) = % of type-V no-history donors (i.e. those that will donate voluntarily at a specific t) = 0 (no history) = % of no-history donors that will donate upon FR request =56.76%, 100%, or 30% 
